Values in Science

Dozenten

Beschreibung

Science is almost universally thought to be valuable in virtue of providing us with both knowledge about the world and the technology we need to survive and thrive within it. Often, the success of science in meeting these goals is explained in terms of its objectivity. While this notion has undergone significant shifts in meaning, one recurring theme among different accounts of objectivity has been the view that scientific reasoning shouldn't be influenced by our political, religious, moral, or social values. On this view, science is concerned only with the facts, and the facts, we might say, are what they are regardless of our beliefs, interests, needs, or desires.

There are, of course, some parts of the broader scientific process that are influenced by values without thereby threatening objectivity. For example, we make value judgements when deciding what topics are worthy of study and how to use the results of our research. Despite this, the general consensus has long been that values should, at least ideally, play no role in the ‘heart’ of science – experimental design, data collection and interpretation, theory evaluation, etc. – an idea known as the ‘value-free ideal’. In one form or another, the value-free ideal has been extremely influential in shaping the self-conception of scientists, the popular understanding of science, and various institutions concerned with facilitating science and applying its results to policy.

In recent years, however, the value-free ideal has increasingly come under attack by philosophers of science. While some cast doubt on our ability to separate science and values entirely, others challenge the notion that this should be an ideal for science at all. Defenders of the value-free ideal, however, claim that rejecting it amounts to giving up on objectivity, and thereby threatens the very characteristic of science that accounts for its success. They point to various historical and contemporary cases of politicized science – e.g. Lysenkoism in the Soviet Union or the current widespread denial of climate science by conservative politicians in many countries – as examples of the destructive force of allowing values and science to mix freely.

In this seminar, we will examine the role of values in science by way of two guiding questions. First, what are the major ways in which scientific reasoning can be influenced by values and value judgments? Second, how can we tell whether or not such influences are acceptable?

While much of the philosophical work on this topic is quite arcane and abstract, the central text we’ll work with (see below) takes a more interdisciplinary approach and works extensively with real-world case studies. Some of the examples we will discuss include: arguments against studying gender-based differences in cognitive abilities; disproportionate funding of research on rare diseases of the rich vs. those more common and devastating around the globe; unforeseen issues of using vitamin-enriched ‘golden’ rice to combat blindness in poor countries; community participation in studying the effects of industrial contamination; unsavory scientific practices by for-profit pharmaceutical companies; balancing of risk and caution in regulating industrial chemicals; influence of activist groups on scientific research; feminist critiques of masculine biases in anthropology and primatology; various aspects of values as they enter into scientific study and debates about climate change.

Texts
Our central text is Kevin C. Elliott’s A Tapestry of Values: An Introduction to Values in Science (Oxford University Press, 2017), which I highly recommend for purchase. Both the book and other supplemental readings will, however, be made available online.

Weitere Angaben

Veranstaltungsart: Seminar (Offizielle Lehrveranstaltungen)
Veranstaltungsnummer: 8.4311
Ort: nicht angegeben
Zeiten: Di. 12:00 - 14:00 (wöchentlich)
Erster Termin: Dienstag, 21.04.2020 12:00 - 14:00

Studienbereiche

• Philosophie > Veranstaltungen
• Philosophie > Aufbaumodul Praktische Philosophie: „Gesellschaft & Staat“
• Philosophie > Aufbaumodul Theoretische Philosophie: „Erkenntnis & Wirklichkeit“